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領域II - (1)　平和構築に向けた知の展開

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Capter 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | fn.

　　Let us then look at Iraq from the angle of conflict, seen as shocks between goals, not necessarily between parties. The latter, violence, may follow when the conflict is not transformed so that the parties can handle it without violence. Confusing conflict with violence opens for a limited and limiting security discourse.

　　From that point on there are four steps, as indicated above:
- identify the parties in the conflict
- identify their goals
- divide goals into legitimate and illegitimate, with BHN as guide
- try to bridge the legitimate goals.

　　Here is an eleven parties model of the conflict in and around Iraq, with three parties inside and eight outside, with the understanding that parties can be subdivided, and more be added.

I. CONFLICT PARTIES INSIDE IRAQ:
Kurds, wanting
- independence, or at least very high level autonomy
- and Turkmen, wanting security, maybe autonomy from the Kurds
Sunni, wanting
- to rule Iraq from Baghdad
- with secular, socialist, welfare state features (ba'athism) Shia, wanting
- an Islamic Republic, for Iraq, at least for themselves

II. CONFLICT PARTIES OUTSIDE IRAQ:
USA, wanting direct/indirect control of Iraq from Baghdad for:
- geopolitical control of Gulf region also for Eurasia control(35)
- corporate economic control of oil, also for geopolitics(36)
- Judeo-Christian fundamentalism, also to protect Israel(37)
UK, wanting
- to settle old imperial accounts with Iraq
- special relation, to be chosen by the country chosen by God
Japan, wanting
- to "normalize Japan" by legitimizing Japanese military (SDF)
- special relation, to be chosen by the world's No. 1.
Australia, Spain etc., wanting
- US anti-terrorist assistance in return for participation
France, Germany, wanting
- EU as independent of the USA in foreign and security affairs
Turkey, wanting
- no Kurdish autonomy as a precedent for Kurds in Turkey
- protection for the Turkmen
Syria, Jordan, Kuwait, Iran, wanting
- not to be attacked by the USA
- good relations with the next Iraq
Saudi Arabia, wanting
- to survive, squeezed between Wahhabism and the USA(38)

　　11 parties, 19 goals is a simplification, but better than "the world against Saddam Hussein". "Eliminating WMD threat" and "Eliminating Al Qaeda bases" are pretexts intelligence services must have known were trumped up.(39) Saddam Hussein's autocracy was not trumped up, but was brought in too be credible as a genuine goal. Nonetheless, there is something genuine about democracy and human rights, but not as a goal given the cooperation with Hussein. US strategy in Iraq is compatible with the three goals stated, their problem being that the control eludes them.(40)

　　The next problem is that of legitimacy: of the 18 goals, how many are legitimate using basic needs and basic rights as guides?

　　The Kurdish and Turkmen legitimacies flow from the right of self-determination, making the first Turkish goal illegitimate.

　　Any Sunni claim to rule all of Iraq, in which they form 21%, is illegitimate continuation of colonial rule. The political goals might possibly obtain democratic legitimacy in that part, however.

　　The Shia goal would also also require democratic legitimacy and could not be imposed, by majority rule, against human rights.

　　The US goals are illegitimate, unmandated by people in Iraq, the Gulf and Eurasia; a US mandate of course being insufficient.(41)

　　The UK goals reflect identity problems to be solved in UK.

　　The Japan identity problems can also only be solved in Japan.

　　The goals of Australia, Spain etc., like for UK and Japan, cannot be met in Iraq at the expense of the BHN of Iraqi people.

　　The French/German goals are legitimate if backed by the people.

　　The goals of the countries bordering on Iraq are legitimate.

　　The Saudi goal reflects a social problem to be solved in Saudi.

　　Behind this reasoning about legitimacy there is a general moral injunction against satisfying own goals at the expense of others.

　　We are left with the legitimate goals of Kurds, Turkmen and the Shia, the French/German aspirations for the EU, of all border countries to escape unmolested. UK, Japan, Australia etc, and Saudi-Arabia have deep-rooted problems, but not solvable at the expense of invading and/or occupying Iraq. How do we bridge that?

　　By the European Union in general, and the leading powers France and Germany in particular, taking the initiative for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East, CSCME, modeled on the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE, 1972-75. One point on the agenda would be Iraq, another the Kurds.

　　Before the war this could have been added to the French/German proposal for continued UN inspection and human rights in Iraq, presented in the UN Security Council March 2003 as an alternative to Anglo-American belligerence.

　　After the war the idea of a CSCME is as relevant as ever. But economic boycott by individuals, and the international civil society in general, may have to be used to put pressure on the invading-occupying countries. The obvious target would be companies that "win Iraq contract" and share the "spoils of war" in this classical, colonialist war. As Arundhati Roy expresses it:(42)

"I suggest we choose by some means two of the major corporations that are benefiting from the destruction of Iraq. We could then list every project they are involved in. We could locate their office in every city and every country across the world. We could go after them. We could shut them down."

　　But why only "two of the major", meaning also why only USA?
To take Australia as an example this include Patrick Corp. (Baghdad Airport), SAGRIC (agriculture), Snowy Mountains Electricity Corp (electricity), GRM International (regulatory systems), Australian Wheat Board (oil for food) and the ANZ Bank (Iraq Trade Bank Consortium).(43) For Spain it would mean Soluziona(44), etc.

　　The solution for Iraq might be neither a unitary state as imposed by colonialism, based on the Mosul, Baghdad and the Basra parts of the Ottoman Empire, nor fragmentation in 18 provinces(45), nor--indeed--a division into three states.(46) The solution might be a federation with high autonomy for the Kurdish, Sunni and Shia parts, with a federal capital not in Baghdad. Kuwait, the 19th province before it was detached in 1899 as a protectorate under the British Empire, might like to be an independent, associated member, with a status similar to Liechtenstein relative to Switzerland. In such a federation a 61% Shia majority dictatorship is impossible.

　　The solution for the Kurds might be to stimulate similar autonomies in Syria, Turkey and Iran, and create a Kurdistan out of the four autonomies, without changing borders, and with a passport with the name Kurdistan, and then one of the four countries on it.

　　And the solution for the problem of Iraqi security might be for USA to withdraw like in Viet Nam(47), stop threatening,(48) and for the Iraqis to invite an appropriate international protection force.

　　Realistic? Considerably more so than the current US exercise. With enormous basic needs costs, with the Mohonk criteria insulted, the USA is now giving "human security", the hard military option, and the fall-back doctrine of pre-emption a bad name. There was no clear and present danger of a mushroom cloud over Manhattan(49), no WMD, no Iraq-Al Qaeda link. But a dark cloud of responsibility is hovering over a the USA, allies, intelligence services and media quadrangle. The Hutton "inquiry" put the blame on the media/BBC.(50) The next inquiry focuses on CIA-FBI/MI6-MI5. But the project has already given the USA Empire itself, and those allies stupid enough to toe the US line, a bad, very bad name.

　　Alternatives? Basic needs+soft intervention+conflict resolution.

Capter 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | fn.

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