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タイトル：「東南アジアのイスラームと文化多様性に関する学際的研究 国際ワークショップ『東南アジアにおける文化多様性（3）』」

（2012年度第2回研究会（通算第4回目））

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報告（1） Julkipli Wadi（University of the Philippines, The Philippines）

“Reframing Policy, Transforming Struggle: Philippine Dynamics of Identity Formation and Self-determination”

This paper posits that southern Philippines is up for a new context of majority-minority relation given the dual or parallel development of government “reframing policy” and the emergence of new mode of struggle in Moro fronts. Such development, while aimed to clinch anew a win-win solution in the age-old Mindanao conflict, inevitably faces new dynamics of identity formation and protracted pursuit of self-determination. It is shown when the Pnoy Aquino Administration hardly minced words to declare that the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) is a failed experiment. The statement was received across political divide with varied reactions ranging from accolade to disavowal and sheer disagreement. Those who seek political change and reform in the ARMM and envision new structural arrangement in Moro areas praised President Benigno Aquino for his position as Malacanang gears up to establish new political entity in Bangsamoro areas. Those slighted took it that past endeavors of governance, development, economic assistance in the ARMM, could just be rendered into irrelevance with such too sweeping remarks. Whatever impacts such position and plan bring, it reveals long-standing government’s propensity of political experiment in Mindanao. If the ARMM is a failed experiment, ergo, the rest of past

political and administrative tiers and pertinent units and offices created, abolished and recreated anew must also be failed experiments. By extension, too, the “Bangsamoro” as political entity must be an experiment, too, while yet to be chiseled from October 2012 to 2016 and onward into post 2016. In different but related vein, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as part of its compromise with Philippine government agreed in the “Ten Decision Point Principles” that the new political arrangement must be a “secular political entity,” a position that would have been difficult to pass with the MILF Central Committee had it been offered in the early days of the MILF given its originally “Islamic” orientation. Yet recently, the MILF easily accepts such condition as it reconfigures its politics and strategy and gears up to transform its mode of struggle from revolutionary to parliamentary. The study examines whether reframing politics is mutually inclusive with new mode of transformative struggle or critical in forging new relation of identities and the pursuit of re-framed version of self-determination.

報告 (2) Abhoud Syed M. Lingga (Institute of Bangsamoro Studies, The Philippines)
“The Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro: Opportunity to Address Muslim Minority Problem in the Philippines”

On October 15, 2012 the Philippine Government (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) signed the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB). The paper attempts to find out if the FAB can provide the opportunity to address the grievances and the aspiration of the Bangsamoro people for self-governance and what are the challenges.

As the conclusion, I point out that The Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro is a viable compromise that balances the assertions of the Bangsamoro people to their right to self-determination and the protective assertion of the Government to preserve its territorial integrity. It provides flexibility for the Bangsamoro to organize institutions that maybe different from the national institutions. Successful implementation of the Agreement will provide lessons for governments and minorities how to address territorial self-determination conflicts.

報告 (3) Ken Miichi (ILCAA Joint Researcher, Iwate Prefectural University)

“Contemporary Social Changes and Cultural Plurality within Muslim Politics: A Case of Jakarta’s Gubernatorial Election in 2012”

Position of Islam has been problematic in Indonesian politics. Political parties have been divided by secular nationalist and Islamic parties and tension between them were very tense during the Sukarno’s era. It has been changed as Islamization proceeded on the one hand and the unity of Indonesian nation-state (so called Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia: NKRI) became accepted generally on the other hand, secular/Islamic state debate had rifted.

However, increasing of religious intolerance in Indonesia has widely reported and concerned in recent years. In fact there are tens of violent incidents related to religious differences including attacks against Christian churches, members of Ahmadiyah sects and more recently Shia school in Madura. A controversial decision to cancel Lady Gaga’s concert in Jakarta strengthen this image to Western media. In addition, several surveys showed increasing intolerance among Muslim majority in Indonesia. How can we understand plurality and complexity of social and political situations in Indonesia?

This presentation analyzes the Jakarta’s 2012 gubernatorial election in which Islam was contested. The incumbent candidate Fauzi Bowo (Foke) emphasized its origin as a Betawi, Jakartan native ethnicity, and some of his supporters claimed that the leader must be a pious Muslim. Because Betawi’s cultural identity is tightly connected with Islam and the rival candidate Joko Widodo (Jokowi) was a less-Islamic Javanese and his running mate Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) was a Chinese Christian, religious differences became very important during the campaign. As Jokowi-Ahok won the election in the end, it was generally considered that religious campaign did not work.

However, it was very slight victory for Jokowi and some areas which Foke won coincided with Betawi Muslim concentrated areas. Several influential Betawi ulama clearly supported the incumbent candidate. Foke diligently visited mosques and zikir gatherings. Jokowi used religious symbols, too, more defensive way. His campaign was more concentrated to local markets, but he made a symbolical umroh pilgrimage just after the first round election. Jokowi also visited several Arabic habib religious leaders

in order to deny his secular outlook. After the election Jokowi and Ahok wore Betawi's folk clothes in order to appeal their closeness to public and probably for reconciliation with Betawi constituency.

This presentation will analyze results of the gubernatorial election through utilizing both quantitative and qualitative data. Quantitative analysis includes national census, opinion surveys and detailed election results and qualitative analysis has conducted through on-going extensive field research. Taking account of changing geographical and sociological settings, the author highlights multi-layered features of contemporary Muslim politics through the analysis.